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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates how firms manage the revenue-expense relationship in the presence of a going-concern 
audit opinion (GCO). Using Korean data, we find that firms with GCOs both delay and accelerate recognition of 
current expenses for current revenues. We also find that firms in severe financial distress that receive GCOs exhibit 
conservative accounting, whereas GCO firms in relatively less financial trouble adopt aggressive accounting. 
Overall, our results imply that firms’ matching extent and behavior provide useful information regarding financial 
reporting and can explain the earnings management behavior of firms with GCOs.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
rior studies have examined whether there are associations between low financial reporting quality and 
a going-concern audit opinion (GCO)1. Several studies (Bartov, Gul, and Tsui 2000; Bradshaw, 
Richardson, and Sloan 2001; Amedo, Lizarraga, and Sanchez 2008) find that a significant 
relationship between GCOs and accounting accruals implies aggressive accounting, whereas Butler, Leone, and 
Willenborg (2004) suggest that this association is driven by firms that have large negative accruals and is due 
mainly to financial distress rather than earnings management. Butler, Leone, and Willenborg (2004) argue that firms 
with GCOs during periods of severe financial distress2 display extreme negative discretionary accruals due to 
transactions conducted to meet liquidity needs through delays in accounts payable and factor accounting receivables. 
Our research question in this paper is thus: how do firms manage the revenue-expense relationship in the presence of 
GCOs? We investigate the association between revenue-expense matching and earnings management by firms that 
receive GCOs, depending on their financial characteristic variables. More specifically, this study examines whether 
firms that receive GCOs accelerate recognition of current expenses in the prior period or delay recognition to the 
following period to manage earnings.  
 
Accelerating or delaying recognition of current expenses on current revenues may appear through the manager’s 
opportunistic accounting choices, under which the manager calculates earnings by artificially adjusting them 
between accounting periods. Based on prior studies (Dichev and Tang 2008; Paek 2011b), types of matching can be 
classified into the following three categories: neutral accounting, where current revenue recognizes current expenses 
in the current period; conservative accounting, whereby current revenues are recognized in the current period, but 
current expenses are recognized in the prior period by accelerating recognition of current expenses on current 
revenues; and aggressive accounting, whereby current revenues are recognized in the current period, but current 
expenses are recognized in the following period by delaying recognition of current expenses. Equivalent to neutral 
accounting, the more properly current revenues and current expenses are matched, the higher the quality of earnings 
                                                
1 In this paper, a going-concern audit opinion (GCO) is defined as an auditor’s issuance of a going-concern audit opinion for the current fiscal 
year’s financial statements of an audit client that received a clean opinion for the previous fiscal year. Audit firms issue a going-concern opinion 
to reflect substantial doubt regarding a client’s ability to continue as a going concern for one year beyond the financial statement date. 
2 Firms in severe financial distress are defined as those with negative equity, losses, and higher leverage, as in the third tertile of portfolios 
partitioned by the total liability to equity ratio. This represents the top 30 percent of portfolios. 
P 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2016 Volume 32, Number 3 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 948 The Clute Institute 
(Paek 2011b). In addition, when a portion of current expenses is identified early in the prior period under 
conservative accounting, earnings persistence increases (Paek 2012). Paek (2012) found that net income, cash flow 
from operations, and market value are higher for a large group with accelerated recognition of current expenses. 
Moreover, a group with a higher delayed recognition of expenses shows significant differences in the earnings range 
of loss avoidance (0.00 – 0.01), which indicates that loss avoidance incentives increase strongly in a large group 
with a higher delayed recognition of expenses. Application of aggressive accounting is suggested when managers 
are provided with opportunistic financial reporting incentives through delayed recognition of current expenses (Basu 
1997; Bhattacharaya, Daouk, and Welker 2003). 
 
In the United States, the overall subsequent bankruptcy rate within 12 months after receiving a GCO is 12.3 percent 
(Geiger and Rama 2006). If a firm experiences the critical uncertainty of a going-concern, the firm may have an 
incentive to consider different types of earnings management, depending on the firm’s financial condition. This 
situation may occur if firms are in severely distressed positions and demonstrate negative equity, losses, and higher 
leverage, or if firms are insolvent, on the edge of bankruptcy, or without sufficient flexibility in earnings 
management (Kim, Sin, and Lee 2014). These firms have extremely negative (-) discretionary accruals, which can 
be interpreted as a firm engaging in downward earnings management (Mutchler, Hoopwood, and McKeown 1997). 
Moreover, financially troubled firms often deliberately reduce reported earnings because managers attempt to 
improve short-term cash flow by disposing of inventory or accounts receivable (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner 
1994). Regarding downward earnings incentives, Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995) indicate that managers 
manipulate earnings downwards when earnings reach either the lower bound or the upper bound and when 
managers’ bonuses are at a maximum. This downward earnings management is derived from conservative 
accounting. When recognizing the phenomenon of extremely negative (-) discretionary accruals as a result of serious 
financial stress, an auditor tends to adopt a conservative attitude/manner based on high litigation risks related to the 
business failure of these firms (Lu and Sapra 2009). The auditor’s conservative approach leads to a reversal of 
excessive accruals that occurred in the prior period (Kim, Son, and Lee 2013), and auditors may force managers to 
make noncash write-offs (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner 1994). Consequently, financial reporting by 
management may appear to exhibit conservative accounting, with current expenses recognized earlier. 
 
However, managers of firms with GCOs and in relatively less severe financial distress3, such as lower firm 
performance and leverage, may engage in upward earnings management to disguise their weak performance in prior 
periods, to bolster investor and stakeholder confidence, or to avoid receiving consecutive GCOs from an auditor 
(Kim 2013). These firms have positive (+) discretionary accruals. If positive (+) discretionary accruals occur 
because of a manager’s opportunistic behavior, the firm’s financial reporting may appear to exhibit aggressive 
accounting, based on the delayed recognition of current expenses for current revenues. In addition, if a firm’s 
financial stress is not severe, managers may have strong incentives to inflate earnings to bind debt covenants and to 
rule out interruption of a board meeting (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner 1994). This study examines the mutual 
incompatibility of discretionary accruals by using types of matching revenues and expenses, such as the accelerated 
or delayed recognition of expenses, depending on the financial characteristic variables of firms that receive GCOs.  
 
Consequently, we first find that the extent of neutral accounting in firms that receive a GCO is extremely low, 
whereas the level of both accelerated and delayed recognition of current expenses is high, indicating that the 
manager’s intention is primarily to intervene in accounting choices. Second, we find that GCO firms in less financial 
distress are more likely to inflate earnings through delayed recognition of current expenses related to current 
revenues. This finding explains why positive (+) discretionary accruals occur in GCO firms facing less financial 
distress. We conclude that the significant relationship between expense recognition and GCOs is conditional on a 
firm’s financial distress. Third, for GCO firms with higher leverage, losses, or negative equity, conservative 
accounting occurs through accelerated recognition of current expenses. These firms are more likely to trigger a 
default of debt repayments, debt restructuring, delisting, the designation of investment consideration, and a market 
warning by way of a GCO in the audit report. Finally, we find that GCO firms with conservative accounting 
practices show extremely negative (-) discretionary accruals. 
                                                
3 Firms in less financial distress are defined as those with lower firm performance and lower leverage, as in the third tertile of portfolios 
partitioned by the total liability to equity ratio and by earnings before taxes and interest, deflated by lagged total assets. This represents the 
bottom 30 percent of portfolios. 
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This study provides two main contributions to the accounting literature. First, GCO firms in less financial distress 
use aggressive accounting to manage their earnings upward (i.e., income-increasing). This result indicates that firms 
with GCOs employ different financial reporting depending on the firm’s characteristic variables. Second, the 
financial reporting of GCO firms can be explained more specifically when using the matching extent as a proxy for 
existing earnings management. This result implies that revenue-expense matching plays a complementary role 
regarding discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management for firms with GCOs. 
 
This study is organized as follows. The research background and hypotheses are developed in reference to prior 
studies in section II, and the model design for testing the hypotheses and the sample selection procedure are 
established in section III. Section IV provides the results of the empirical research, and conclusions are stated in 
section V. 
 
2. RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Research Background 
 
The matching principle, the basis of accrual accounting, has been a major subject of research related to earnings 
management, the most widely studied subject area in accounting (Donelson, Jennings, and McInnis 2011). Matching 
can be categorized into neutral, aggressive, and conservative accounting according to recognition of expenses 
related to current revenues (Paek 2011a). Neutral accounting refers to the manner in which current revenues and 
current expenses are most appropriately matched, whereas aggressive or conservative accounting represents delayed 
or accelerated recognition of current expenses, respectively. For the past 40 years, an increase in earnings volatility 
and a decrease in earnings persistence have been observed owing to the deteriorating neutrality of accounting 
(Dichev and Tang 2008); conversely, trends in conservative and aggressive accounting have strengthened (Paek 
2011a). Increase neutrality in accounting results in higher quality of earnings in terms of higher earnings persistence, 
earnings predictability, income smoothing, and earnings response coefficients (Paek 2011b). Additionally, if the 
portion of current matching is recognized in an accelerated manner in the prior period, earnings persistence will be 
significantly higher than when the portion of current matching is recognized in a delayed manner (Paek 2012). If 
there are no managerial opportunistic incentives, current expenses will be recognized in an accelerated manner, or 
current revenues will be recognized in a delayed manner. Furthermore, if aggressive financial reporting 
characteristics exist, current expenses will be recognized in a delayed manner, or there will be an accelerated 
recognition of future revenues in the current year (Basu 1997; Bhattacharaya, Daouk, and Welker 2003). This 
finding implies a possible method of earnings management in relation to the matching principle if managerial 
opportunistic incentives exist.  
 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
Factors that affect the matching principle include inevitable business environments, uncertainties in economic 
circumstances, managerial discretion, and changes in the accounting regulation system (Donelson, Jennings, and 
McInnis 2011). Moreover, prior studies of accounting information and its usefulness indicate that firm characteristic 
variables, such as losses, nonrecurring items, and firm size, affect matching extent and behavior (Collins, Maydew, 
and Weiss 1997; Francis and Shipper 1999). In a study of firm characteristic variables that affect matching amid 
changes in accounting environments, Paek (2011a) indicates that losses and discretionary accruals are significantly 
associated with inappropriate matching. This means that higher loss reporting, depreciation of tangible and 
intangible assets, and discretionary accruals lead to an increased probability of inappropriate matching. Whereas 
prior studies focus on understanding the reasons for changes in matching, this study provides an additional 
contribution by further analyzing the possibility that financial distress and managerial discretion affect matching. On 
the other hand, many studies find that auditors are more likely to issue GCOs when firms are less profitable, have 
higher leverage, have lower liquidity, have had a prior GCO and have defaulted on debt (Carson et al. 2013).  
 
In view of the prior literature cited above, we propose that if ambivalent (intertwined phenomena) characteristics of 
earnings management are observed in firms that receive GCOs, a systematic relationship is likely to be observed 
based on the financial characteristic variables. Thus, investigating GCO firms’ financial reporting characteristics is 
important in demonstrating a significant relationship between the revenue-expense matching principle and earnings 
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management. We expect that if a GCO firm changes its business strategy depending on the level of financial distress 
and if the results of its financial reporting are affected by the manager’s interruption of accounting choices and 
estimates, those firms may use recognition of current expenses related to current revenues to either aggressively or 
conservatively account for the firm’s level of financial distress; this behavior occurs pursuant to financial 
characteristic variables such as firm performance, debt to equity ratio, and negative equity. Based on this logic, we 
hypothesize the following: 
 
H1: Firms with GCOs will both delay and accelerate recognition of current expenses for current revenues. 
 
In general firms that receive GCOs are financially distressed. In a study of the financial reporting characteristics of 
GCO firms listed in Korea, Kim (2013) finds that these firms demonstrate income-increasing earnings management 
through positive (+) discretionary accruals and downward earnings management through extremely negative (-) 
discretionary accruals. Hyun et al. (2014), who examine the fundamental reasons for worsening scenarios under the 
matching principle, find that change in interest costs is the main reason for mismatching because of changes in the 
debt-equity ratio. Recognition of revenues and expenses by firms with GCOs can be delayed or accelerated, 
depending on firm characteristic variables such as the debt-equity ratio, the return on assets, and impaired capital. 
Delayed or accelerated recognition of revenues and expenses can affect the financial reporting characteristics of 
firms that follow this business strategy (Paek 2013). Therefore, firms that receive GCOs are expected, in their 
entirety, to demonstrate both positive (+) and negative (-) discretionary accruals simultaneously. As such, firms that 
receive GCOs may exhibit matching with attenuated neutrality owing to recognition of delayed and accelerated 
current expenses. If firms with GCOs have positive discretionary accruals, this scenario reflects the manipulation of 
accounting numbers, or aggressive accounting, through recognition of current expenses later. Conversely, if firms 
that receive GCOs have negative discretionary accruals, this scenario indicates downward earnings, or conservative 
accounting, through recognition of current expenses earlier. Therefore, we hypothesize the following: 
 
H2: Firms with highly positive (+) discretionary accruals that receive GCOs are associated with aggressive 
accounting, i.e., recognition of current expenses later, whereas firms with extremely negative (-) discretionary 
accruals that receive GCOs are associated with conservative accounting, i.e., recognition of current expenses earlier. 
 
For GCO firms that are in relatively less severe financial distress or are characterized by lower firm performance 
and leverage, incentives may exist to increase earnings, although the increased earnings may raise significant 
questions amid going-concern uncertainties; these incentives include aggressive accounting to reduce the cost of 
interest for debt financing, to disguise the prior period’s weak firm performance, or to avoid receipt of the same 
GCO from auditors by recognizing current expenses in a delayed manner. Conversely, if severe financial distress 
reaches a serious condition, such as impaired capital (i.e., negative equity), loss in earnings or high leverage, a firm 
has a high probability of becoming insolvent and is on the edge of bankruptcy. Such firms also have a high audit risk 
of business failure, according to auditors. If the audit risk is high, the prior period’s accruals often reverse because of 
auditors’ conservatism (Lu and Sapra 2009), resulting in extremely negative (-) discretionary accruals. An auditor’s 
conservatism may increase asset write-offs and decrease earnings through recognition of current expenses earlier, a 
scenario that reflects conservative accounting. Based on the above logic, we hypothesize the following: 
 
H3: Firms in more severe financial distress that receive GCOs are more likely to adopt conservative accounting, i.e., 
recognize current expenses earlier, whereas firms with less financial distress that receive GCOs are more likely to 
adopt aggressive accounting, i.e., recognize current expenses later.  
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
3.1 Research Design 
 
3.1.1 Controlling for Potential Sample-Selection Bias and Endogeneity of GCO Firms  
 
An auditor’s decision to express a GCO is not random but depends on a firm’s characteristics. There is a probability 
that differences in auditors’ personal tendencies or the characteristics of audit firms can affect the test results 
(Bartov, Gul, and Tsui 2000; Butler, Leone, and Willenborg 2004; Kaplan and Williams 2013). Moreover, because 
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of possible endogeneity between discretionary accruals and GCOs, which may lead to simultaneous equation and 
omitted variables bias, this issue must be controlled. To address the sample-selection bias and endogeneity issues, 
we use the Heckman (1979) two-stage regression model. We estimate the probability that a firm receives a GCO, 
using the first-stage model, where firms that receive GCOs are the dependent variable. We estimate the inverse mills 
ratio (Lambda) via the probit model, using firm characteristics as explanatory variables.  
 
In the probit model (1), we include the prior period’s absolute discretionary accruals as a control variable because a 
firm with low earnings quality is likely to have a GCO (Mutchler, Hoopwood, and McKeown 1997). The higher the 
level of financial distress is, the greater the probability of receiving a GCO is. We also include leverage (LEV), long-
term debt (LTDT), and the change in long-term debt (CLTDT) (Mutchler, Hoopwood, and McKeown 1997); in 
addition, we use firms with a loss (LOSS) as control variables because such firms have a high risk of business 
failure. Altman’s (1968) Z-score is included as a proxy for the risk of bankruptcy (Mutchler 1985); in addition, cash 
flow from operations (CFO), cash and cash equivalents (CASH), and return on assets (ROA) are used as proxies for 
operational performance and liquidity (Mutchler, Hoopwood, and McKeown 1997; DeFond, Ragunandan, and 
Subramanyam 2002; Fargher and Jiang 2008). Big 4 is included as a control variable because firms audited by a Big 
4 accounting firm have a high probability of receiving a GCO based on a Big 4 audit firm’s high auditing quality 
(DeAngelo 1981). The inverse mills ratio, estimated in the first stage, is included as a control variable in the two-
stage model used to test the hypotheses. 
1st stage: 
 
Probit (GCOit) = α0 +α1ABS_DAit-1 +α2LnSALEit +α3LEVit +α4ROAit +α5CASHit  
+α6 Zit +α7CZit +α8CFOit +α9LTDTit +α10CLTDTit +α11BIG4it  
+α12LOSSit+εit (1) 
 
See the Appendix for definitions of the variables. 
 
This study uses Kothari, Leone, and Wasley’s (2005) model to estimate discretionary accruals based on the modified 
Jones (1991) model with reflected firm performance (ROA). Discretionary accruals are measured using the 
coefficients of model (2), estimated for non-GCO firms by year and industry. The estimated discretionary accruals 
are then used in model (3) for GCO firms. 
 
TAit= c1 + c2 (ΔSALEit－ΔARit) + c3PPEit + c4ROAit +εit (2) 
 
DAit = TAit-〔č1+ č2 (ΔSALEit－ΔARit) + č3PPEit + č4ROAit〕 (3) 
 
DA (PO_ or NE_DA)it = b10 + b11 GCOit + b12 Lambda +b13 SIZEit + b14 BTMit + b15 LEVit  
+ b16 CFOit + b17 GRWit + b18 ABS_TAit + b19Zit + b20BIG4it  
+ b21LOSSit + b22ROAit-1 + b 23ROAit-12 +∑ID + ∑YR+ εit (4) 
 
See the Appendix for definitions of the variables. 
 
To analyze the relationship between GCOs and discretionary accruals, we formulate model (4) in which the 
dependent variable is discretionary accruals, and the independent variables are firms that receive GCOs for the 
current fiscal year’s financial statements. We expect that the coefficient (b11) is significant and positive. 
 
Control variables include audit firm size (SIZE), operating cash flow (CFO), and the debt-to-book value ratio (LEV) 
(Nah and Choi 2000). We control for size, book to market, and leverage, consistent with Butler, Leone, and 
Willenborg (2004). Firm size indicates a firm’s information environment and is used as a proxy for the various 
omitted variables (Becker et al. 1998). The debt-to-book value (LEV) is negatively associated with discretionary 
accruals because a higher debt-to-book value ratio may lead to stronger incentives to engage in earnings 
management (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). Operating cash flow is expected to be negatively related to 
discretionary accruals (Dechow 1994; DeFond and Subramanyam 1998), whereas the growth rate (GRW) is 
positively associated with discretionary accruals because growing firms wish to show strong firm performance and 
sustainable growth. The Altman (1968) Z-score is a summary measure of financial risk, and firms’ loss (LOSS) 
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signifies higher operating risk. Lagged ROA and ROA squared are included to control for a non-linear relationship 
between firm performance and discretionary accruals (Butler, Leone, and Willenborg 2004; Kothari, Leone, and 
Wasley 2005). 
 
3.1.2 Hypothesis Testing Model 
 
Dichev and Tang (2008) estimate the degree of matching by regressing prior, current, and next year’s expenses on 
current revenues. The regression coefficients, a1, a2, and a3, represent the respective degrees of early, neutral, and 
delayed recognition of expenses in regression model (5). A larger positive a2 denotes a higher degree of matching, 
which means that the firm exhibits proper matching between current expenses and current revenues. A larger 
positive a1 indicates earlier recognition of current expenses, which is consistent with conservative accounting; and a 
larger positive a3 indicates delayed recognition of current expenses, which is consistent with aggressive accounting. 
 
REVit  = a0 + a1 EXPit-1 + a2 EXPit + a3 EXPit+1 + eit (5) 
 
REVit  = a10 + a11GCOit + a12EXPit-1 + a13GCOit*EXPit-1 + a14EXPit (6) 
+ a15GCOit*EXPit+ a16EXPit+1 + a17GCOt*EXPit+1 + eit 
 
See the Appendix for definitions of the variables. 
 
Equation (6) is used to examine the degree of matching of firms that receive GCOs. In equation (6), variables of 
interest include the interactions between firms with GCOs and expenses in prior, current, and subsequent years (for 
which the coefficients are a13, a15, and a17, respectively). We expect that the coefficient a15 for neutral accounting 
will be significant and negative (-), whereas the coefficients a13 and a17 will be significant and positive (+). 
 
To test hypothesis 2, we divide firms with GCOs into three portfolios by discretionary accruals and determine 
matching types for firms with the highest and lowest discretionary accruals. We expect that the group with the 
highest discretionary accruals uses aggressive accounting, i.e., recognizes current expenses in a delayed manner, 
whereas the group with the lowest accruals uses conservative accounting, i.e., recognizes current expenses earlier, 
leading to downward earnings management. To determine the types of matching exhibited by firms with GCOs, as 
indicated by discretionary accruals, we employ regression model (7). We expect that the coefficient (b35) for the 
interaction between the lowest discretionary group and prior period expenses (LDA*EXPt-1) and the coefficient (b40) 
for the interaction between the highest discretionary group and subsequent period expenses (HDA*EXPt+1) will both 
be significant and positive (+). 
 
REVt = b30 + b31HDAit + b32LDAit + b33EXPit-1 + b34HDAit*EXPit-1 (7) 
+ b35LDAit*EXPit-1 + b36EXPit+ b37HDAit*EXPit + b38LDAit*EXPit 
+ b39EXPit+1 + b40HDAit*EXPit+1 + b41LDAit*EXPit+1 + et 
 
See the Appendix for definitions of the variables. 
 
Although firms with GCOs are characterized by the same uncertainty, they may have different financial reporting 
characteristics owing to differing levels of financial distress. Therefore, we test ways in which the matching of firms 
that receive GCOs changes, using the debt-equity ratio, firm performance, and negative equity as firms’ 
characteristic variables. To test hypothesis 3, firms with GCOs are divided into three portfolios according to debt-to-
equity ratio (LEV). Firms with negative equity that receive GCOs are found in the highest debt-to-equity ratio 
portfolio, which is more severely financially distressed. We use only the highest and lowest portfolios in regression 
model (8). For GCO firms with the highest debt-to-equity ratios and negative equity, we test the hypothesis that they 
use conservative accounting. To support hypothesis 3, coefficients a34 and a53 would be significant and positive (+).  
 
To identify less financially distressed firms, firms with GCOs are divided into three portfolios based on firm 
performance (ROA). We use only the highest and lowest portfolios of firms, as measured by ROA, in regression 
model (10). The highest leverage firms with negative equity (NEGEQ) indicate more severely financially distressed 
firms, whereas the lowest performance (ROA) firms indicate less financially distressed firms. For GCO firms with 
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the highest and lowest firm performance, we test the hypothesis that firms with the lowest ROAs use aggressive 
accounting. To support hypothesis 3, the coefficient a81 would be significant and positive (+). 
 
REVit = a30 + a31HLEVit + a32LLEVit + a33EXPit-1 + a34HLEVt*EXPit-1 (8) 
+ a35LLEV*EXPit-1 + a36EXPit + a37HLEV*EXPit + a38LLEVit*EXPit 
+ a39EXPit+1 + a40HLEVit*EXPit+1 + a41LLEVit*EXPit+1 + eit 
 
REVit = a50 + a51NEGEQit+ a52EXPit-1 + a53NEGEQit*EXPit-1 + a54EXPit (9) 
+ a55NEGEQit*EXPit + a56EXPit+1+ a57NEGEQit*EXPit+1 + eit 
 
REVit = a70 + a71HROAit + a72 LROA it+ a73EXP it-1+ a74 HROAit*EXPit-1 (10) 
+ a75 LROA*EXP it-1+ a76EXPit-1+ a77 HROAit*EXP it+ a78 LROAit*EXPit 
+ a79 EXP it+1+ a80HROAit*EXP it+1+ a81 LROAit*EXPit+1 + eit 
 
See the Appendix for definitions of the variables. 
 
3.2 Sample Selection 
 
The sample is selected from firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) and the Korea Dealers Automated 
Quotation (KOSDAQ) during the years 2000 to 2010. Firms that receive GCOs are manually collected from audit 
reports in the Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer (DART) System (http://dart.fss.or.kr). We extract the firms that 
receive unqualified opinions but have separately identified a GCO in the explanatory paragraph of the external audit 
reports; these we designate as firms that receive GCOs. Because of differences in the information contents of the 
other audit opinions, we exclude firms with qualified, adverse, or disclaimer opinions in the audit reports. We also 
exclude financial firms because they have a different financial data composition than non-financial firms. More 
specifically, the sample is limited to firms that satisfy the following conditions: 
 
(1) Companies listed on KSE and KOSDAQ of the Korean capital markets, 
(2) Non-financial firms, and 
(3) Firms for which financial data can be retrieved from KIS-VALUE and the TS-2000 database. 
 
The sample from KSE and KOSDAQ listed firms, excluding financial companies, includes 20,413 firm-year 
observations. Among these, firms that receive GCOs generate 1,232 firm-year observations during the sample period 
after excluding firm-years from 1999, the year that auditing standards for GCOs changed. In addition, 2,089 firm-
year observations were eliminated because of missing financial data. Because firms that receive GCOs experience 
extreme financial stress, the distribution of such firms is skewed to one side. To minimize the loss of firms that 
received audit opinions, we separate firms into two groups: those that received GCOs and those that did not receive 
GCOs. In addition, we truncate the sample by eliminating outliers that lie beyond the top and bottom 0.5% of each 
variable. As a result, 149 firm-year observations of firms with GCOs and 3,860 firm-year observations of firms 
without GCOs are removed. The final sample includes 1,083 firm-year observations of firms with GCOs and 13,232 
firm-year observations of firms without GCOs for a total of 14,315 firm-year observations.  
 
Table 1 shows the composition of firms with GCOs and firms without GCOs by year. The number of GCO firms 
increased during 2003 and 2004, when accounting reform acts were passed in Korea, and during 2007 and 2008, 
when the global financial crisis and economic depression set in (Fargher and Jiang 2008; Gramling, Krishnan, and 
Zhang 2011; Xu et al. 2011).  
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Table 1. Firms with GCOs by year 
Year No. of Obs. Non-GCO firms GCO firms 
2000 945 881 64 
2001 1,113 1,067 66 
2002 1,230 1,142 98 
2003 1,327 1,210 117 
2004 1,317 1,199 118 
2005 1,334 1,254 80 
2006 1,377 1,283 94 
2007 1,425 1,310 115 
2008 1,471 1,277 194 
2009 1,394 1,296 98 
2010 1,352 1,313 39 
Total 14,315 13,232 1,083 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the total sample. Panel B provides descriptive statistics for 
firms that received GCOs and firms that did not receive GCOs along with the p-values used in t-tests and non-
parametric tests of equality between the two groups (t-test and Wilcoxon signed rank test). There are significant 
differences with respect to most variables for firms that received GCOs and firms that did not. The means of prior 
and current expenses are both below 1.0, whereas the mean of next-year expenses is above 1.0, showing low 
neutrality accounting and delayed recognition of current expenses. Firms with GCOs appear to have higher prior, 
current, and next-year expenses compared with firms without GCOs. The size (SIZE) of firms with GCOs is smaller, 
and the growth rates (GRW) and market-to-book value ratios (BTM) are lower for such firms than for firms without 
GCOs. Whereas cash flow from operations (CFO) of firms with GCOs is significantly low, firm losses (LOSS) and 
long-term debt (LTDT) are substantially higher than those for firms without GCOs. However, the change in LTDT, 
which is the difference between long-term debt in the prior period and current period, is significantly low, meaning 
that the long-term debts of firms with GCOs are reduced. This condition aggravates operating cash flow. Moreover, 
the debt-to-equity ratios of firms with GCOs appear to be high, whereas the Altman Z-scores (Z) of firms with 
GCOs are significantly low, implying that the risk of bankruptcy is high. In other words, the financial stress of firms 
with GCOs is significantly higher than that of firms without GCOs.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A. Total Sample (n=14,315) 
Variable Mean Median Std Min Q1 Q3 Max 
REVt 1.001 0.937 0.713 0.000 0.607 1.313 24.490 
EXPt+1 1.071 0.968 0.585 0.006  0.695  1.307 23.915 
EXPt 0.985 0.920 0.705 0.000 0.614 1.278 30.326 
EXPt-1 0.985 0.921 0.786 0.000 0.606 1.287 38.972 
DA -0.001 0.005 0.108 -4.215 -0.055 0.060 3.954 
SIZE 18.274 18.069 1.338 13.350 17.344 18.986 23.728 
CFO 0.036 0.045 0.135 -1.994 -0.018 0.107 0.689 
ROA 0.040 0.047 0.120 -1.491 0.006 0.097 0.496 
BIG4 0.476 0.000 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
LEV 1.151 0.746 3.641 -55.430 0.373 1.335 45.192 
Z 2.648 2.388 3.104 -45.990 1.528 3.490 69.183 
GRW 0.171 0.064 8.046 -4.580 -0.055 0.192 91.396 
CASH 0.074 0.045 0.087 0.000 0.016 0.099 1.201 
LTDT 0.051 0.014 0.127 0.000 0.000 0.064 8.220 
LOSS 0.265 0.000 0.441 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
(Table 2 continued on next page)  
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(Table 2 continued) 
Panel B. Sample by GCO (n=1,083) and non-GCO (n=13,232) 
Variable Group Mean Median Std Min Q1 Q3 Max t-stat. Wilcoxon z-stat. 
REVt 
GCO 0.802 0.625 1.499 0.000 0.332 0.959 30.065 -9.17*** -17.80*** Non-GCO 1.019 0.965 0.651 0.000 0.641 1.336 12.758 
EXPt+1 
GCO 1.258 1.070 1.010 0.006 0.741 1.523 23.915 -11.03*** -7.80*** Non-GCO 1.056 0.960 0.532 0.015 0.692 1.292 4.811 
EXPt 
GCO 1.118 0.949 1.359 0.000 0.650 1.330 30.326 -6.48*** -2.65*** Non-GCO 0.974 0.917 0.621 0.000 0.612 1.273 12.675 
EXPt-1 
GCO 1.109 0.927 1.692 0.000 0.610 1.337 38.972 -5.31*** -1.54 Non-GCO 0.974 0.921 0.653 0.000 0.605 1.283 12.675 
DA GCO  -0.014 0.048 0.571 -4.215 -0.161 0.215 3.954 2.36** 7.15*** Non-GCO -0.001 0.004 0.108 -1.062 -0.052 0.055 0.774 
SIZE GCO  17.351 17.265 1.201 13.350 16.627 17.860 22.705 24.07*** 25.15*** Non-GCO 18.410 18.184 1.298 15.447 17.497 19.080 23.728 
CFO GCO  -0.160 -0.101 0.249 -1.994 -0.243 -0.008 0.689 54.61*** 36.29*** Non-GCO 0.052 0.051 0.103 -0.487 -0.005 0.111 0.496 
ROA GCO  -0.179 -0.143 0.202 -1.491 -0.261 -0.045 0.263 72.93*** 44.90*** Non-GCO 0.054 0.049 0.088 -0.405 0.013 0.098 0.496 
BIG4 GCO 0.321 0.000 0.467 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 10.62*** 10.57*** Non-GCO 0.498 0.000 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
LEV GCO 3.168 1.377 12.002 -55.430 0.338 3.499 45.192 -19.74*** -12.81*** Non-GCO 0.962 0.712 1.013 -7.875 0.366 1.248 26.957 
Z GCO -1.841 -1.008 5.085 -45.990 -3.523 0.448 69.183 54.35*** 47.85*** Non-GCO 3.050 2.526 2.583 -4.063 1.737 3.657 36.800 
GRW GCO -0.042 -0.160 1.749 -4.580 -0.532 0.105 39.531 10.87*** 20.53*** Non-GCO 0.186 0.070 8.458 -2.654 -0.038 0.192 91.396 
CASH GCO 0.055 0.017 0.109 0.000 0.004 0.054 1.201 7.41*** 17.31*** Non-GCO 0.074 0.048 0.082 0.000 0.018 0.100 0.635 
LTDT GCO 0.101 0.003 0.379 0.000 0.000 0.063 8.220 -13.67*** 3.91*** Non-GCO 0.044 0.013 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.061 0.997 
LOSS GCO 0.917 1.000 0.276 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 -55.79*** -50.56*** Non-GCO 0.221 0.000 0.415 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
1) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels in a two-tailed test, respectively.  
2) Mean difference is t-test, and median difference is non-parametric (Wilcoxon two-sample test, two-sided).  
3) See the Appendix for definitions of the variables. 
 
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
 
The upper right section of Table 3 shows Pearson correlations, and the lower left section indicates Spearman 
correlations. Correlations between firm size (SIZE) and prior and current expenses are significant and negative (-), 
showing that larger firms tend to delay recognition of current expenses on current revenues. The correlation between 
recognition of expenses in the following period and firm size is insignificant. Early recognition of current expenses 
and GCO firms are significantly and positively correlated. There is a significantly negative correlation between 
GCO firms and Altman (1968) Z-scores (Z), which represent the bankruptcy index, so that firms facing severe 
financial distress have a higher probability of receiving GCOs. The Pearson (Spearman’s) correlation between firms 
with GCOs and neutral recognition is significantly positive although relatively low, with a value of 0.054 (0.022), as 
is that between firms with GCOs and delayed recognition of current expenses, with a value of 0.046 (0.023). 
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Table 3. Correlation analysis (Pearson/Spearman) 
 DA GCO REV EXPt-1 EXPt EXPt+1 SIZE BTM LEV Z GRW LTDT LOSS 
DA 1 -0.019 (0.018) 
0.203 
(<.0001) 
-0.099 
(<.0001) 
0.153 
(<.0001) 
0.180 
(<.0001) 
0.057 
(<.0001) 
0.033 
(0.000) 
0.011 
(0.171)) 
0.211 
(<.0001) 
-0.017 
(0.049) 
-0.037 
(<.0001) 
-0.137 
(<.0001) 
GCO 0.059 (<.0001) 1 
-0.076 
(<.0001) 
0.091 
(<.0.001) 
0.054 
(<.0001) 
0.046 
(<.0001) 
-0.197 
(<.0001) 
-0.078 
(<.0001) 
0.162 
(<.0001) 
-0.413 
(<.0001) 
-0.007 
(0.381) 
0.113 
(<.0001) 
0.422 
(<.0001) 
REV -0.010 (0.200) 
-0.148 
(<.0001) 1 
0.618 
(<.0.001) 
0.914 
<.0001) 
0.667 
(<.0001) 
0.030 
(0.000) 
-0.010 
(0.277) 
-0.013 
(0.106) 
0.149 
(<.0001) 
-0.019 
(0.027) 
-0.063 
(<.0001) 
-0.103 
(<.0001) 
EXPt-1 
-0.083 
(<.0001) 
0.065 
(<.0001) 
0.617 
(<.0001) 11 
0.667 
(<.0001) 
0.603 
(<.0001) 
-0.096 
(<.0001) 
-0.011 
(0.234) 
0.028 
(0.000) 
-0.01 
(<.0001) 
-0.001 
(0.857) 
-0.014 
(0.085) 
-0.011 
(0.160) 
EXPt 
-0.011 
(0.179) 
0.022 
(0.008) 
0.931 
(<.0001) 
0.671 
(<.0001) 1 
0.725 
(<.0001) 
-0.019 
(0.018) 
-0.012 
(0.181) 
0.003 
(0.668) 
0.030 
(0.000) 
-0.021 
(0.014) 
-0.056 
(<.0001) 
0.006 
(0.461) 
EXPt+1 
0.023 
(0.007) 
0.013 
(0.124) 
0.599 
(<.0001) 
0.583 
(<.0001) 
0.643 
(<.0001) 1 
0.010 
(0.221) 
-0.007 
(0.449) 
0.008 
(0.307) 
0.041 
(<.0001) 
-0.010 
(0.236) 
-0.057 
(<.0001) 
0.007 
(0.406) 
SIZE 0.022 (0.007) 
-0.210 
(<.0001) 
0.053 
(<.0001) 
-0.099 
(<.0001) 
-0.023 
(0.005) 
0.009 
(0.269) 1 
0.020 
(0.029) 
0.058 
(<.0001) 
0.057 
(<.0001) 
0.001 
(0.852) 
0.006 
(0.459) 
-0.197 
(<.0001) 
BTM 0.057 (<.0001) 
-0.068 
(<.0001) 
-0.087 
(<.0001) 
-0.026 
(0.004) 
-0.084 
(<.0001) 
-0.075 
(<.0001) 
0.163 
(<.0001) 1 
0.046 
(<.0001) 
-0.016 
(0.090) 
-0.006 
(0.428) 
-0.184 
(<.0001) 
-0.035 
(0.000) 
LEV 0.013 (0.116) 
0.107 
(<.0001) 
0.096 
(<.0001) 
0.254 
(<.0001) 
0.160 
(<.0001) 
0.141 
(<.0001) 
0.189 
(<.0001) 
0.076 
(<.0001) 1 
-0.105 
(<.0001) 
0.000 
(0.992) 
0.079 
(<.0001) 
0.098 
(<.0001) 
Z 0.063 (<.0001) 
-0.399 
(<.0001) 
0.312 
(<.0001) 
0.162 
(<.0001) 
0.158 
(<.0001) 
0.137 
(<.0001) 
0.004 
(0.593) 
-0.427 
(<.0001) 
-0.468 
(<.0001) 1 
-0.000 
(0.980) 
-0.210 
(<.0001) 
-0.384 
(<.0001) 
GRW -0.008 (0.341) 
-0.180 
(<.0001) 
-0.042 
(<.0001) 
0.180 
(<.0001) 
-0.086 
(<.0001) 
-0.046 
(<.0001) 
0.064 
(<.0001) 
-0.115 
(<.001) 
0.038 
(<.0001) 
0.240 
(<.0001) 1 
-0.003 
(0.671) 
-0.013 
(0.114) 
LTDT 0.032 (0.001) 
-0.032 
(<.0001) 
-0.035 
(<.0001) 
-0.000 
(0.976) 
-0.047 
(<.0001) 
-0.048 
(<.0001) 
0.102 
(<.0001) 
0.092 
(<.0001) 
0.426 
(<.0001) 
-0.227 
(<.0001) 
0.081 
(<.0001) 1 
0.048 
(<.0001) 
LOSS -0.136 (<.0001) 
0.422 
(<.0001) 
-0.164 
(<.0001) 
-0.029 
(0.000) 
-0.079 
(0.032) 
-0.014 
(0.101) 
-0.208 
(<.0001) 
-0.045 
(<.0001) 
0.151 
(<.0001) 
-0.532 
(<.0001) 
-0.287 
(<.0001) 
-0.041 
(<.0001) 1 
1) The numbers above (below) the diagonal are Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients. p-value are in parentheses. 
2) See the Appendix for definitions of the variables. 
 
4.3 Multivariate Regression Model 
 
4.3.1 Type of Matching of Revenues and Expenses for GCO Firms 
 
Table 4 reports the results of matching for GCO firms, as estimated using Dichev and Tang’s (2008) model. The 
coefficient for the interaction between GCO firms and prior-period expenses (early recognition of current expenses) 
is 0.277, and the coefficient for the interaction between these firms and following-period expenses is 0.087; both 
results are positive and significant at the 1% level. Additionally, there is a significant and negative relationship 
between neutral accounting of firms with GCOs and current revenues (-0.463), with a significance level of 1%. This 
result suggests that these firms have a tendency towards low neutrality. In other words, firms with GCOs are 
expected, in their entirety, to simultaneously adopt conservative accounting that recognizes current expenses in an 
early manner and aggressive accounting that recognizes current expenses in a delayed manner. This finding further 
implies that such firms have different financial reporting characteristics that reflect their own financial conditions. 
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Table 4. Revenue-expense matching and GCO firms 
REVit = a0 + a1GCOit + a2EXPit-1 + a3GCOit*EXPit-1 + a4EXPit + a5GCOit*EXPit (6) 
 + a6EXPit+1 + a7GCOit*EXPit+1 + eit  
Variable Coefficient (t-stat.) 
Intercept 0.050*** (7.97) 
GCOit -0.454*** (-19.34) 
EXPit-1 -0.000 (-0.02) 
GCOit*EXPt-1 0.277*** (21.59) 
EXPit 0.998 (91.03) 
GCOit *EXPit -0.463*** (-26.60) 
EXPit+1 0.013 (1.23) 
GCOit*EXPit+1 0.087*** (5.06) 
No. of Obs.   14,315 
F statistics 6,299 
Adj. R2  0.803 
1) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels in a two-tailed test, respectively. 
2) See the Appendix for definitions of the variables. 
 
4.3.2 Type of Matching of Firms that Receive GCOS Depending on the Level of Discretionary Accruals 
 
Table 5 depicts the results of matching GCO firms within the highest and lowest portfolios. As expected, the 
coefficient for the group with the lowest discretionary accruals (LDA*EXPt-1) is significant and positive (+), with a 
value of 0.231; this result indicates that this group may use early recognition of current expenses on current revenues 
(i.e., conservative accounting) or downward earnings management. Conversely, the coefficient for the group with 
the highest discretionary accruals is 0.039, which is positive (+) and marginally significant at the 10% level, 
implying that this group may choose aggressive accounting. This result is consistent with hypothesis 2, which 
suggests that GCO firms with the highest positive (+) discretionary accruals are associated with aggressive 
accounting through recognition of current expenses later; however, firms with the lowest negative (-) discretionary 
accruals are associated with conservative accounting through recognition of current expenses.  
 
Table 5. Matching of firms with GCOs with the highest and lowest discretionary accruals 
REVt  = b30 + b31HDAit + b32LDAit + b33EXPit-1 + b34HDAit*EXPit-1  (7) 
 + b35LDAit*EXPit-1 + b36EXPit+ b37HDAit*EXPit + b38LDAit*EXPit   
 + b39EXPit+1 + b40HDAit*EXPit+1 + b41LDAit*EXPit+1 + et  
Variable REV Coefficient (t-stat.) 
Intercept -0.173** (-2.54) 
HDAit 0.018 (0.15) 
LDAit 0.362** (2.44) 
EXPit-1 0.362** (2.57) 
HDAit*EXPit-1 -0.058 (-0.69) 
LDAit*EXPit-1 0.231** (2.32) 
EXPit 0.755*** (9.85) 
HDAit *EXPit -0.068 (-0.52) 
LDAit *EXPit -0.652*** (-6.26) 
EXPit+1 0.027 (0.40) 
HDAit*EXPit+1 0.039* (1.61) 
LDAit*EXPit+1 0.050 (0.48) 
No. of Obs. 1,083 
F statistics 185.07 
Adj. R2 0.667 
1) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels in a two-tailed test, respectively.  
2) See the Appendix for definitions of the variables. 
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4.3.3 Conservative Accounting of GCO Firms Through the Matching Principle  
 
Table 4 shows that conservative or aggressive accounting is applied to the same firms with GCOs. This result 
indicates that firms with the same uncertainty of continuing as a going-concern may report their financial 
performances differently according to the level of firms’ financial distress. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze how 
the matching principle differs depending on the debt-to-equity ratio (LEV), negative equity (NEGEQ), and firm 
performance (ROA) as financial characteristics variables. This study partitions the full sample by debt-to-equity ratio 
and firm performance into three portfolios and then uses the highest and lowest portfolios as dummy variables in the 
regression.  
 
Table 6 indicates the results of the matching principle for firms with GCOs in the highest and lowest portfolios 
partitioned by debt-to-equity ratio. In addition, the table depicts the relationship between current revenues and prior-
, current- and following-period recognition of expenses for GCO firms with negative equity (i.e., impaired capital) 
and losses (i.e., negative ROA). Both the highest and lowest groups exhibit low neutrality in accounting, which is 
similar to the results presented in Table 4. However, the coefficient for early recognition of current expenses for the 
highest debt-to-equity portfolio is significant and positive (+), whereas the coefficient for neutral recognition is 
significantly negative (-), which indicates low neutral accounting. This result supports hypothesis 3, suggesting the 
existence of income-decreasing earnings management via conservative accounting that recognizes current expenses 
in an accelerated manner. Conversely, the coefficient for the interaction between delayed recognition of current 
expenses and a high debt-to-equity ratio is insignificantly related to current revenues. These firms are in serious 
financial trouble with regard to negative equity and loss, which may increase the risk of firm failure and result in a 
conservative audit (Lu and Sapra 2009). An auditor’s conservative approach may prevent a manager’s intended 
intervention in accounting choices. Consequently, these firms exhibit conservative accounting that recognizes 
current expenses early. The coefficient for the interaction between prior-period expenses and negative equity 
(NEGEQ*EXPt-1) of firms with GCOs is 0.495 (t=4.95), which is positive (+) and significant at the 1% level. The 
coefficient for the interaction between prior period expenses and negative equity (NEGROA*EXPt-1) of GCO firms 
is 0.166 (t=1.98), which is positive (+) and significant at the 5% level. This result is also consistent with hypothesis 
3, implying that conservative accounting that recognizes current expenses early is applied to GCO firms with 
impaired capital or losses. Conversely, firms with negative equity that receive GCOs may attempt mass asset 
disposal (Kim, Sin, and Lee 2014); in addition, such firms are more likely to be involved in default on the 
redemption of debt, delisting, and designation of investment consideration.4  
 
  
                                                
4 Test results are not tabulated; however, the probability of default or delisting, as indicated by the coefficients for negative equity firms, are 
0.816 and 0.395, respectively, both of which are positive (+) and significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 6. Conservative accounting of firms received GCOs with financial characteristic variables through matching principle 
Variable REV REV REV Coefficient (t-stat) Coefficient (t-stat) Coefficient (t-stat) 
Intercept -0.229** (-2.15) -0.208*** (-3.18) -0.003 (-0.04) 
HLEVit 0.051 (0.49)     
LLEVit  0.354** (2.03)     
NEGEQit   0.280** (1.93)   
NEGROAit     0.008 (0.07) 
EXPit-1 0.067 (0.81) 0.187** (2.54) 0.021 (0.26) 
HLEVit*EXPit-1 0.221** (2.16)     
LLEVit*EXPit-1 0.002 (0.98)     
NEGEQ*EXP it-1   0.495*** (4.95)   
NEGROA*EXPit-1     0.166** (1.98) 
EXPt 0.865*** (9.29) 0.632*** (7.33) 0.966*** (8.90) 
HLEVit*EXPit -0.412*** (-3.38)     
LLEVit *EXPit -0.409*** (-2.92)     
NEGEQ*EXP it   -0.534*** (-4.27)   
NEGROA*EXPit     -0.576*** (-4.88) 
EXPit+1 0.045 (0.50) 0.104** (2.33) -0.003 (-0.66) 
HLEVit*EXPit+1 0.129 (1.13)     
LLEVit*EXPit+1 -0.032 (-0.27)     
NEGEQ*EXP it+1   -0.133 (-1.27)   
NEGROA*EXPit+1     0.067 (0.95) 
No. of Obs. 940 1,083 1,083 
F statistics 118.58 277.45 296.05 
Adj. R2 0.579 0.659 0.671 
1) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels in a two-tailed test, respectively. 
2) See the Appendix for definitions of the variables. 
 
4.3.4 Aggressive Accounting of GCO Firms Within the Lowest ROA Portfolio 
 
Table 7 provides the results of an analysis employing firm performance in the same manner as the debt-to-equity 
ratio was employed above. The results show that GCO firms within the highest firm performance portfolio have 
insignificant coefficients for the neutral, accelerated, or delayed recognition of current expenses, whereas GCO 
firms with low firm performance have positive (+) and significant coefficients for the delayed recognition of current 
expenses and a low neutrality in accounting. The coefficient for the interaction between subsequent-period expenses 
and lowest firm performance (LROA*EXPt+1) is 0.64, which is positive (+) and significant at the 1% level. This 
result supports hypothesis 3, implying that GCO firms with poor financial performance may adopt aggressive 
financial reporting that increases earnings to disguise low prior firm performance and reduce the cost of debt 
financing. 
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Table 7. Aggressive accounting of firms with GCOs within the lowest ROA portfolio 
REVit + a75LROAit*EXPit-1 + a76EXPit+ a77HROAit*EXPit + a78LROAit*EXPit (10) 
 + a75LROAit*EXPit-1 + a76EXPit+ a77HROAit*EXPit + a78LROAit*EXPit  
 + a79EXPit+1 + a80HROAit*EXPit+1 + a81LROAit*EXPit+1 + eit  
Variable REV Coefficient (t-stat.) 
Intercept -0.112*** (-3.15) 
HROAit 0.125** (2.41) 
LROAit 0.082** (2.15) 
EXPit-1 0.176*** (2.91) 
HROAit*EXPit-1 -0.126 (-1.64) 
LROAit*EXPit-1 0.064 (0.43) 
EXPit 0.759*** (7.26) 
HROAit *EXPit 0.166 (1.52) 
LROAit *EXPit -0.523*** (-4.23) 
EXPit+1 -0.034 (-0.70) 
HROAit*EXPit+1 0.073* (1.68) 
LROAit*EXPit+1 0.164*** (2.79) 
No. of Obs. 1,083 
F statistics 242.75 
Adj. R2 0.682 
1) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels in a two-tailed test, respectively. 
2) See the Appendix for definitions of the variables. 
 
4.3.5 Financial Reporting Quality and GCO Firms  
 
Table 8 presents the test results, using a probit model in the first stage to estimate the probability of issuing a GCO 
and the relationship between discretionary accruals and firms that received GCOs by a two-step regression. First, 
Heckman’s (1979) first-stage regression analysis is conducted to control for sample selection bias and endogeneity. 
The first-stage regression shows that high operating losses, bankruptcy risk, a high debt-to-equity ratio, lagged 
discretionary accruals, low firm performance, and low operating cash flow lead to a high probability of receiving a 
GCO. Moreover, the inverse mills ratio (Lambda) is estimated from the first-stage regression and includes a two-
step regression model as a control variable. In the results of the two-step regression, the coefficient for discretionary 
accruals for firms that receive GCOs is 0.193, which is positive and significant at the 1% level. Positive 
discretionary accruals are positively associated with firms that receive GCOs, indicating that such firms are 
characterized by income-increasing earnings management. Additionally, the coefficient for the interaction between 
GCO firms and negative discretionary accruals is significantly negative, which implies that such firms exhibit 
income-decreasing earnings management. This result is consistent with findings of prior studies (Bartov, Gul, and 
Tsui 2000; Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan 2001; Amedo, Lizarraga, and Sanchez 2008). 
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Table 8. Discretionary accruals of firms with GCOs, using Heckman (1979)'s 2 SLS 
1st stage: Probit (GCOit) = α0 +α1ABS_DAit-1 +α2LnSALEit +α3LEVit +α4ROAit +α5CASHit  
+α6 Zit +α7CZit +α8CFOit +α9LTDTit +α10CLTDTit +α11BIG4it +α12LOSSit+εit 
(1) 
2nd- stage: DAit (PO_ or NE_DA)it = b10 + b11 GCOit + b12 Lambda +b13 SIZEit + b14 BTMit + b15 LEVit  
+ b16 CFOit + b17 GRWit + b18 ABS_TAit + b19Zit + b20BIG4it 
+ b21LOSSit + b22ROAit-1 + b 23ROAit-12 +∑ID + ∑YR+ εit 
(4) 
Variable 1st stage Coefficient (p-value) 
DA 
Coefficient (t-stat.) 
PO_DA 
Coefficient (t-stat.) 
NE_DA 
Coefficient (t-stat.) 
Intercept -0.149 0.728 0.018 (1.01) -0.064** (-2.37) -0.187 (-7.20) 
ABS_DAit-1 1.947*** <.0001       
LnSALEit -0.117*** <.0001       
LEVit 0.071*** <.0001       
ROAit -4.099*** <.0001       
CASHit -1.233*** 0.000       
Zit -0.103*** <.0001 0.006*** (14.77) 0.003*** (5.16) -0.002*** (-18.17) 
CZit 0.000 0.845       
CFOit -1.649 <.0001 -0.857*** (-72.32) -0.445*** (16.58) -0.732*** (-32.95) 
LTDTit 2.514*** <.0001       
CLTDTit -2.032*** <.0001       
BIG4it -0.106* 0.052 0.001 (0.60) -0.004 (-1.45) -0.002 (-0.66) 
LOSSit 0.640*** <.0001 -0.079*** (-26.38) -0.045*** (-8.99) -0.076*** (-18.16) 
GCOit   0.193*** (16.80) 0.191*** (11.85) -0.414*** (-23.10) 
Lambda   -0.038*** (-6.11) -0.065*** (-7.26) 0.144*** (14.63) 
SIZEit   0.003*** (3.00) 0.005*** (3.47) 0.009*** (6.91) 
BTMit   0.000 (0.96) 0.000 (0.58) -0.000*** (-3.22) 
LEVit   0.002*** (3.07) 0.004*** (3.86) 0.006*** (7.24) 
GRWit   0.003** (2.22) 0.000 (0.70) -0.006 (-1.49) 
ABS_TAit   -0.619*** (-61.05) 0.516*** (17.40)   
ROAit-1   0.066*** (5.06) 0.000 (0.02) 0.085*** (3.99) 
ROA2it-1   0.052 (1.41) 0.003 (0.07) -0.309*** (-4.29) 
No. of Obs. 14,315 14,315 7,452 6,773 
F statistics  771.51 162.52 193.99 
Max-rescaled/Adj. R2 0.637 0.537 0.313 0.368 
1) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels in a two-tailed test, respectively. 
2) See the Appendix for definitions of the variables. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This study examines whether firms that receive GCOs use accelerated or delayed recognition of current expenses as 
a method of earnings management depending on firm characteristic variables. We expect that these firms will make 
different accounting choices according to their financial distress levels and will exhibit low neutrality of matching 
owing to various incentives in making accounting choices. Low neutrality in accounting will cause early or delayed 
recognition of current expenses on current revenues. 
 
This study found that firms with GCOs either delay or accelerate recognition of current expenses for current 
revenues according to their financial conditions. We also found that firms in more severe financial distress, such as 
higher leverage, loss, and impaired capital, exhibit conservative accounting, which accelerates the recognition of 
current expenses for current revenues. Conversely, GCO firms in relatively less financial trouble exhibit aggressive 
accounting, which delays recognition of current expenses. Consistent with the fact that upward (downward) earnings 
management usually involves positive (negative) discretionary accruals, by estimating the regression of positive (+) 
and negative (-) discretionary accruals on current revenues, we also found that only GCO firms with negative (-) 
discretionary accruals adopt conservative accounting. 
 
This study provides empirical evidence that firms under financial distress that receive GCOs manage earnings by 
either accelerating or delaying recognition of current expenses and demonstrates a significant relationship between 
revenue-expense matching and discretionary accruals. Our findings contribute to the accounting literature by 
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providing empirical evidence that for these firms, earnings management can be better explained by the matching 
extent or behavior related to discretionary accruals as a proxy for the earnings management approach of firms with 
GCOs. One key implication of this study is that investors and other stakeholders can use the information obtained on 
the relationship between revenue-expense matching and financial reporting characteristics of GCO firms to assist 
them in investment decisions and policies. Because this study uses only Korean data, the results may be limited in 
terms of generalization and comparability. However, this paper broadly demonstrates that firms with GCOs exhibit 
different financial reporting behaviors depending on their financial characteristic variables. Future research is 
needed to verify the financial reporting characteristics of firms that do not receive subsequent GCOs in the following 
year.  
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APPENDIX 
 
GCOit dummy variable (equal to 1 for the firms that received going-concern modified opinions for the current fiscal 
year’s financial statements and 0 otherwise); 
ABSDAit-1 lagged absolute discretionary accruals at firm i and year t-1; 
LnSALEit natural logarithm of total sales; 
LEVit total liabilities divided by total book value; 
ROAit earnings before tax and interests divided by lagged total assets; 
CASHit cash and cash equivalent; 
Zitit Altman (1968) Z-score; 
CZit change of Altman (1968) Z-score; 
CFOit operating cash flow deflated by lagged total assets; 
LTDTit long-term debt divided by lagged total assets; 
CLTDTit change of long-term debt divided by lagged total assets; 
BIG4it dummy variable (equal to 1 if firms are audited by one of Big 4 auditors (Samil, SamJung, AhnJin, HanYoung) 
and 0 otherwise; 
LOSSit dummy variable (1 if net earnings are less than 0 and 0 otherwise); 
TAit total accruals (net earnings minus operating cash flow) deflated by lagged total assets; 
ΔSALEit change of sales deflated by lagged total assets; 
ΔARit change of accounts receivable deflated by lagged total assets; 
PPEit Property, plant and equipment deflated by lagged total assets; 
DAit discretionary accruals (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 2005); 
PO_DAit positive discretionary accruals (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 2005); 
NE_DAit negative discretionary accruals (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 2005); 
Lambda inverse Mills ratio of Heckman (1979) estimated going-concern probability by probit model; 
SIZEit natural logarithm of total assets; 
BTMit total book value divided by market value; 
GRWit change of sales deflated by lagged total sales; 
ABS_TAit absolute total accruals; 
Zit Altman’s (1968) Z-score; 
ROAit-1  lagged earnings before taxes and interest divided by lagged total assets; 
ROAit-12  ROA it-1’s square; 
∑ID industrial dummy; 
∑YR year dummy; 
REVit total sales and non-operating income divided by lagged total assets at year t-1; 
EXPit-1 total expenses (cost of goods, sales & administration expenses, and non-operating expenses) divided by lagged 
total assets at year t-1; 
EXPit total expenses (cost of goods, sales & administration expenses, non-operating expenses) divided by lagged total 
assets at year t; 
EXPit+1 total expenses (cost of goods, sales & administration expenses, non-operating expenses) divided by lagged total 
assets at year t+1; 
NEGEQit dummy variable (1 if firms have negative equity, otherwise 0); 
HLEVit dummy variable (1 if one for the third tertile of portfolio (highest) partitioned by total liability to equity ratio, 
otherwise 0); 
LLEVit dummy variable (1 if three for the third tertile of portfolio (lowest) partitioned by total liability to equity ratio, 
otherwise 0);  
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HROAit dummy variable (1 if one for the third tertile of portfolio (highest) partitioned by earnings before taxes and 
interest deflated by lagged total assets, otherwise 0);  
LROAit dummy variable (1 if three for the third tertile of portfolio(lowest) partitioned by earnings before taxes and 
interest deflated by lagged total assets, otherwise 0).  
HDAit dummy variable (1 if one for the third tertile of portfolio (highest) partitioned by discretionary accruals, 
otherwise 0);  
LDAit dummy variable (1 if three for the third tertile of portfolio (lowest) partitioned by discretionary accruals, 
otherwise 0).  
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